Not a travel article...
The death of soldier Lee Rigby outside the Woolwich barracks
in London has Britain questioning the efficiency
of their security services in monitoring Islamists to prevent acts of violence.
The British parliament has debated internet regulation as a means to prevent
radicalisation. However, it remains possible that Lee Rigby’s death was equally
a result of MI5 recruitment processes.
In the 21st century western intelligence agencies
face particular recruitment challenges that are unparalleled in a
Muslim-majority country like Bangladesh .
Following the September 11 attacks on New York ,
agencies in countries like Britain
discovered a need to exponentially improve their knowledge of Islam and
Islamism, which was arguably rudimentary.
Further, with the stage set for rapid expansion in terms of
budgets, powers and employee numbers, the need to recruit agents from more
diverse backgrounds became immediate. Otherwise
security agencies risked becoming outdated.
Gone were the days of the proverbial tap on the shoulder
when the ideal agent was from an elite school, male and white. Gone was the cold war framework where the
“enemy” was a foreign state’s agent of similar training and background.
Western security agencies were slow to recognise these
changes, but some years after September 11, British agencies in particular
tried to engage with Muslim minority communities in the UK , in terms of
targeted recruitment campaigns directed at shedding the white, elitist image of
MI5 and MI6, and also through general advertisements.[1]
By contrast, coercive or punitive recruitment, while
tempting for security agencies, is fraught with dangers.
Shortly after Rigby’s death, suspect Michael Adebolajo, a
man of Nigerian Christian background who converted to Islam in 2003, was
captured on film holding a bloodied knife and meat clever. It is reported he
was arrested in 2010 in Kenya ,
on suspicion of travelling to Somalia
to join the terrorist outfit al-Shabaab. There are allegations he was tortured
and sexually assaulted in Kenyan police custody.[2]
It has also been alleged that Adebolajo was approached by
MI5 and asked to work for them, that he refused and was subsequently harassed.
Such allegations raise concerns MI5’s recruitment efforts might have pushed
Adebolajo ‘over the edge.’ Further, if the recruitment claims are true, then
the issue of failings in risk identification and surveillance by MI5 are a
furphy, since Adebolajo was a well-known quantity; and issues of hatred on the
internet become a scapegoat.
Coercive recruitment can hardly be considered legal activity
since the British parliament has not deigned to introduce conscription to Britain , nor
has it granted security powers to agencies for recruitment purposes. Any such
powers used in that way are surely powers misused. Indeed, security powers are
properly for the benefit of public safety and not for the benefit of security
agencies.
Where recruitment pursues a coercive course, it cannot
amount to less than a form of public corruption, since Britons retain the right
to live their own lives and choose careers independently, regardless of whom
they know or how “useful” they may be.
Prolonged coercive recruitment efforts are a recipe for just
the kind of violence that occurred in Woolwich, or worse. Any individual
plagued by a security agency for illegitimate reasons will have their breaking
point, especially where “No” is not an accepted answer.
Meanwhile security agencies involved in coercive recruitment
have significant incentive not to desist, not to fail. It is not possible that
prolonged recruitment efforts will not result in the recruitment target gaining
some knowledge of security agents’ methods or, where they have spoken directly
to the target, of agents’ identities. The further the process goes, arguably
the stronger is the incentive for the agency not to desist, because successful
coercive recruitment is needed to secure methodology and identities, especially
in circumstances like Adebolajo’s where there are suspected links with Islamist
groups who might otherwise take benefit from the recruitment target’s
observations.
Further, recruitment is an ideal means of cover up for any
excesses or “anomalies” on the part of agents, because the recruited cannot
speak. Excesses become likely because individual agents involved put at risk
their careers when information and identities are compromised. The answer of
no, calls into question the agent’s judgement.
It is not possible to conduct coercive recruitment exercises
without these inherent conflict of interest issues. The practice is a big
welcome mat for corruption. This is beside the practical issue as to what
quality of informant or recruit a coerced individual might be.
Indeed where coercive recruitment mingles with investigation
and it becomes unclear where the one activity finishes and the other starts,
the ability of agents to manage decisions about the proper use of security
powers will become murky. This is likely to be in the majority of instances
since the investigated and the potential recruit will be the same person: a
Muslim or somebody with Muslim affiliations, and ideally with some link to
Islamism, and people or organisations of interest.
It is worthwhile turning one’s mind to what coercive
recruitment may mean. It is not simply the “tap on the shoulder”, but
potentially interference with careers, friends and family. Potentially, the
goal might be to make life so unbearable that the target has no choice. Armed
with extensive powers and operating in the shadows it is not difficult for
agents to pursue such a course. Should such non-consensual intrusive exercises
be allowed?
Details concerning Adebolajo’s recruitment claims are
sketchy. His friend Abu Nusaybah said on the BBC’s Newsnight that Adebolajo
felt harassed by MI5 and told his friend, “They are bugging me. They won’t
leave me alone.”[3]
The Independent newspaper meanwhile, reported claims Adebolajo
was first approached by MI5 while in custody in Kenya . In light of the allegations
of mistreatment by the Kenyan police such claims are very serious. Abu Nusaybah
has since written to the Commons Intelligence and Security Committee, the
government probe into MI5’s role in the events, requesting investigation as to
whether there was any connection between Adebolajo’s alleged mistreatment in Kenya and MI5.
Regardless of the outcome, coercive recruitment exercises
are not in the interest of good governance and public safety. Self-managed and
self-assessed, such exercises are easily without limit: the minimum possibility
in Adebolajo’s case is six months but coercive recruitment could potentially
last for years.
For reasons of conflict of interest, the potential for
corruption and to cause violence, coercive recruitment should be legislatively banned,
with punitive measures for agents that cross the line. Security agencies committed to
professionalism would have no difficulty committing to such management
safeguards.
But security is an unusual matter of state. Unlike health or
education, in security it may be considered more beneficial for responsible
ministers and parliamentarians passing security legislation not to know, not to
consider the details of how those agencies operate. “Let the experts do their
job” and “We don’t comment on issues of national interest” are a common refrain
that would not be acceptable in other portfolios. Thus it remains to be seen
how seriously the issue is investigated this time.
One can’t help but wonder if, because coercive recruitment
is likely to affect almost solely Muslims, whether security agencies in western
countries haven’t been dealt a freer hand than they otherwise would have been.
It may be that a valid measurement of a western government’s
commitment to professionalism in the security sector is to examine just how it
is that coercive recruitment is regulated.
Lee Rigby: did he die due to identification and surveillance
failures, due to online messages of hate or was his in equal part a coercive
recruitment fatality? If the latter, how
many more should there be?
[1] Working
for MI5: what you need to know about the recruitment process, The Guardian, 9 March 2012
[2] Terror in Woolwich: MI5 ‘tried to recruit suspect
in Kenyan jail,’ The Independent
[3] Woolwich terrorist attack: friend claims MI5 to recruit Michael Adebolajo, ABC News
This article also published in Star Magazine, here: Death by Recruitment
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